Knowledge Integration in the Andalusian Scholarly Tradition: An Analytical Case Study of the Intellectual Legacy of Ibn Juzayy al-Gharnati

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ABSTRACT

This study examines knowledge integration within the Andalusian scholarly tradition through the writings of the polymath Ibn Juzayy al-Gharnati, focusing on four works: Al-Nur al-Mubin fi Qawa'id 'Aqa'id al-Din, Al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah, Taqrib al-Wusul ila 'Ilm al-Usul, and Al-Tashil li-'Ulum al-Tanzil. It investigates how Ibn Juzayy draws upon theology, legal theory, and linguistics to interpret texts and elucidate legal rulings, while situating his intellectual practice within its Andalusian setting. Employing a comparative analytical method, the study examines the purposes underlying these works and compares selected passages across them. It finds that Ibn Juzayy's concision is inseparable from the organization of knowledge and clarification of technical terminology, and that the extent of his discussion of a given question varies with the purpose of the work in which it appears. His theological arguments and treatment of specific legal questions, including the term qurʾ and the rules of tayammum (dry ablution), reveal how linguistic meanings and principles of legal theory help explain the sources of juristic disagreement and support the preference for particular interpretations. The study thus demonstrates a mode of reasoning in which distinct Islamic disciplines contribute complementary, yet differentiated, functions to the construction of an argument.

Keywords: Knowledge integration; Andalusian scholarly tradition; Ibn Juzayy; Islamic legal theory (usul al-fiqh); Qur'anic exegesis; Islamic theology

INTRODUCTION

The study of Islamic disciplines requires attention not only to the subject matter and questions of each field, but also to the relationships that connect them. Knowledge establishes bonds among its practitioners, and the sciences complement one another. A Qur'anic exegete, for example, needs a command of Arabic and principles that assist in interpreting meanings and weighing scholarly opinions. A jurist bases a ruling on evidence whose proper identification depends upon principles of legal inference. A scholar of theology and creed needs an understanding of logic, since the task entails bringing rational argumentation together with a sound understanding of transmitted revelation.

This integration, and the significance of these connections, becomes especially apparent when the same question is examined in more than one work. Such a comparison shows what an author draws from each discipline, how that knowledge is employed, and what interpretive or legal conclusions follow.

The legacy of Abu al-Qasim Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Juzayy al-Gharnati provides an opportunity to investigate this question through surviving works in theology, Islamic legal theory, jurisprudence, and Qur'anic exegesis. Four works have been selected for the present study: Al-Nur al-Mubin fi Qawa'id 'Aqa'id al-Din (hereafter Al-Nur al-Mubin), Al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah (hereafter Al-Qawanin), Taqrib al-Wusul ila 'Ilm al-Usul (hereafter Taqrib al-Wusul), and Al-Tashil li-'Ulum al-Tanzil (hereafter Al-Tashil). Although written by the same scholar, these works differ in their aims and modes of presentation. Comparing them therefore makes it possible to trace a question as it moves from the formulation of foundational principles to the elucidation of a ruling or the interpretation of a Qur'anic verse. This comparative approach forms the basis of the present investigation of knowledge integration in Ibn Juzayy's scholarship.

Merely enumerating the books that Ibn Juzayy, or any other scholar, composed in different disciplines does not establish such integration. A scholar may possess wide-ranging knowledge without the influence of one discipline upon another becoming apparent in a particular question. Similarly, placing a theological section before chapters of jurisprudence reflects a decision about the arrangement of material, but does not in itself explain how that decision relates to the substance of an argument. Accordingly, this study concentrates on passages in which Ibn Juzayy explains his need for particular disciplines and on examples

that reveal the specific roles those disciplines play.

Research Problem and Objectives

The central research question is as follows: How do theological, legal-theoretical, juristic, and exegetical forms of knowledge interact in Ibn Juzayy's writings, and what does comparison among his works reveal about his method of constructing arguments and explaining legal rulings? This question entails defining knowledge integration and its relationship to the Andalusian intellectual milieu; identifying how Ibn Juzayy orders the disciplines and assigns functions to them; and analyzing selected examples that demonstrate both the effects and limits of their interconnections.

The study seeks to move beyond a general description of Ibn Juzayy's erudition to explain how his method operates in particular cases. It also distinguishes between what he explicitly states in the introductions to his books and what emerges through comparison of his applications.

Research Methodology

The research adopts a comparative analytical method. It examines the introductions to the four books in order to identify their purposes and then compares selected passages relevant to the subject. Each comparison identifies the question under consideration, presents Ibn Juzayy's position, determines the type of evidence on which he relies, and explains how different disciplines contribute to interpreting the text or applying the legal ruling.

Previous Scholarship

Previous studies have explored important aspects of Ibn Juzayy's intellectual legacy. Among the most comprehensive is Ali Muhammad al-Zubayri's Ibn Juzayy wa-Manhajuhu fi al-Tafsir (Ibn Juzayy and His Method of Qur'anic Exegesis). This book examines Ibn Juzayy's intellectual formation, the sources of his exegesis, and his approaches to particular questions, giving special attention to theology, language, jurisprudence, legal theory, and logic in Al-Tashil. [1] It thus illuminates ways in which these disciplines inform his commentary. The present study builds upon these findings while shifting the focus toward comparison among his different works, in addition to considering his exegetical method.

Another relevant work is Tariq ibn Ahmad al-Faris's doctoral dissertation, 'Ulum al-Qur'an 'inda al-Imam Ibn Juzayy al-Kalbi wa-Atharuha fi Tafsirihi al-Tashil li-'Ulum al-Tanzil (The Qur'anic Sciences in the Work of Imam Ibn Juzayy al-Kalbi and Their Influence on His Commentary Al-Tashil li-'Ulum al-Tanzil). It investigates questions relating to the Qur'anic sciences, Ibn Juzayy's treatment of them, and their effects on his interpretation of verses, while comparing his views with those of other exegetes. [2] Although useful for connecting the author's theoretical principles to his applications, this dissertation does not primarily compare his theological, legal-theoretical, juristic, and exegetical writings.

The contribution of the present study lies in comparing parallel passages across four works to show how the function of a particular question changes with the author's purpose: establishing a theological principle, regulating inference, interpreting a Qur'anic text, or presenting a legal ruling. Examples include comparing the argument for divine oneness in Al-Nur al-Mubin with Ibn Juzayy's interpretation of relevant verses in Al-Tashil, and examining how certain principles of legal theory inform the interpretation of legal expressions. In this way, the study offers close textual analysis of the disciplines at work in specific passages, while distinguishing the mere multiplicity of fields of knowledge from their integration within argumentation.

Structure of the Study

The study comprises three main sections. The first examines the concept of knowledge integration and its Andalusian context; the second considers the relationships among the disciplines in the composition of Ibn Juzayy's works and the purposes underlying them; and the third analyzes practical examples by comparing the formulation of principles with their use in argumentation across these writings. A conclusion summarizes the findings supported by the textual evidence and the limits of the conclusions that may be drawn from them.

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[1] Al-Zubayri, Ali Muhammad, Ibn Juzayy wa-Manhajuhu fi al-Tafsir (Damascus and Beirut: Dar al-Qalam, 1st ed., 1407 AH/1987 CE), vol. 1, pp. 31-35, especially pp. 32 and 34 (outline of the book).

[2] Al-Faris, Tariq ibn Ahmad ibn Ali, 'Ulum al-Qur'an 'inda al-Imam Ibn Juzayy al-Kalbi wa-Atharuha fi Tafsirihi al-Tashil li-'Ulum al-Tanzil, PhD dissertation, Umm al-Qura University, College of Da'wah and Fundamentals of Religion, Department of the Qur'an and Sunnah, 1434 AH/2013 CE, dissertation abstract (unnumbered preliminary leaf).

Section One: Knowledge Integration in the Andalusian Milieu and Ibn Juzayy's Intellectual Formation

The examination of Ibn Juzayy's legacy begins by defining knowledge integration and then identifying the intellectual context in which he developed.

1.1. The Meaning of Knowledge Integration and the Limits of Its Application

The Arabic term takamul (integration or complementarity) derives from the root k-m-l, which conveys the idea of completeness. Ibn Faris writes: 'The letters kaf, mim, and lam form a sound root signifying the completion of a thing. One says kamala al-shay' [the thing became complete], for it is kamil, that is, complete; and I completed it. God Most High says: "Today I have perfected your religion for you" [Qur'an 5:3].' [3] This lexical sense provides a starting point for understanding the concept, but does not by itself specify what the present study means by it. Not every instance of completeness constitutes integration among disciplines, nor does the assembly of several components in one book necessarily establish a meaningful intellectual relationship among them. A book may contain numerous independently sound chapters without demonstrating how they relate to one another or drawing upon those relationships to interpret questions and weigh competing positions.

As for ma'rifah (knowledge or cognition), al-Jurjani defines it as 'apprehending a thing as it is; unlike 'ilm [knowledge], it is preceded by ignorance. For this reason God Most High is called al-'Alim [the All-Knowing] rather than al-'Arif [the one who comes to know].' [4] Here, the term refers to a scholar's acquisition of the questions, principles, and methods of reasoning associated with particular disciplines. On this basis, the expression 'knowledge integration' is used in the present study to mean one discipline's contribution to another in clarifying a question, establishing an argument, or regulating legal inference.

This definition helps distinguish three phenomena that are sometimes conflated in descriptions of scholars. The first is breadth of learning, manifested in the diversity of teachers, texts, and fields studied. The second is diversity of authorship, manifested in the composition of books in different disciplines. The third is methodological interconnection among those disciplines, demonstrated when principles from one field are used to clarify questions belonging to another. For example, expertise in grammar is not relevant here simply because its possessor is also a jurist or exegete; it becomes relevant when grammatical inflection or a difference in the signification of a form contributes to interpreting a text or justifying a ruling derived from it. The same applies to legal theory: the issue is not simply whether an author has written a book on usul al-fiqh, but rather how its principles shape his exegesis and his presentation of juristic disagreement.

Differences in presentation do not negate integration. A question may appear in a theological work to establish an article of faith, in a work of legal theory to specify the conditions under which evidence may be adduced, and in an exegetical work to explain a verse. Differences in formulation and elaboration across these contexts should therefore generally be understood in light of each work's purpose and intended readership.

Connections among the Disciplines in Andalusian Education and Scholarship

Ibn Khaldun's account of educational methods offers a useful point of departure for understanding some aspects of the combination of disciplines in Andalusia. He observes that the education of children there was not restricted to the Qur'an: 'Rather, in teaching their children, they generally combine the recitation of poetry, epistolary composition, learning and memorizing the rules of Arabic, and the cultivation of beautiful handwriting and writing.' [5] This connection is relevant to the present subject, because the study of the religious sciences requires proficiency in the language of their foundational texts, especially when questions concern the meanings of words and the structure of discourse.

Ibn Khaldun, however, follows his description by noting weaknesses in the continuation of education beyond its initial stage in the regions he discusses. His testimony should therefore be read alongside examples from the scholars' own books, which reveal how varied forms of knowledge became instruments of explanation and inference. The writings of Ibn Rushd the Elder, Ibn Atiyyah, and Ibn Rushd the Younger, all predating Ibn Juzayy, illustrate aspects of this relationship and ground the discussion of the Andalusian

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[3] Ibn Faris, Ahmad ibn Faris ibn Zakariyya al-Qazwini, Mu'jam Maqayis al-Lughah (Dar al-Fikr, 1979), vol. 5, p. 139, entry k-m-l.

[4] Al-Jurjani, Al-Ta'rifat (Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1983), p. 221.

[5] Ibn Khaldun, Abd al-Rahman ibn Muhammad (d. 808 AH), Diwan al-Mubtada' wa-al-Khabar fi Tarikh al-'Arab wa-al-Barbar wa-man 'Asarahum min Dhawi al-Sha'n al-Akbar (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 2nd ed., 1408 AH/1988 CE), p. 741.

milieu in identifiable scholarly practices.

One early Andalusian illustration appears in the introduction to Al-Muqaddimat al-Mumahhidat by Abu al-Walid Ibn Rushd the Elder. Describing what he presented to his students at the beginning of the books of Al-Mudawwanah, he states that he addressed 'the meaning of its title, the derivation of its wording, and the elucidation of its basis in the Qur'an and Sunnah.' He then linked these matters to points on which scholars agreed or disagreed, referred subsidiary questions back to their foundations, and organized their meanings. [6] This passage describes a concrete scholarly practice in which language, scriptural evidence, and jurisprudence work together. The commentator begins by explaining the chapter's designation, establishes its religious basis, and then examines its subsidiary issues and disputed points. Etymology is thus not an independent addition imported into jurisprudence but a means of defining its subject matter; nor is the citation of a verse or hadith detached from the rulings founded upon them.

The point becomes clearer when Ibn Rushd discusses the opening of the Book of Ablution: 'I treated it at length because I based it on premises drawn from beliefs concerning the foundations of religion and from the principles of jurisprudence relating to legal rulings.' [7] Here, theology and legal theory precede the detailed treatment of practical rulings, showing that an Andalusian precedent existed for placing questions of creed at the beginning of a juristic work. This provides a context for Ibn Juzayy's decision to open Al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah with theology. His distinctive contribution emerges in the amount of theological material he selects, its arrangement and condensation, and its restatement in an independent theological work. Moreover, Ibn Rushd's account describes his teaching sessions and his method of explanation, thus linking authorship to instruction. It demonstrates how organizing the relations among disciplines responds to a learner's need to understand a question, its evidence, and its foundation. The comparison accordingly establishes a prior scholarly context that helps explain Ibn Juzayy's approach in his own writings.

In the introduction to Al-Muharrar al-Wajiz, the Andalusian exegete Ibn Atiyyah describes the position of Qur'anic studies among the sciences as 'the knowledge that gives the religious law its foundation and makes all other forms of knowledge its servants.' He proceeds to describe his method of interpreting a verse: 'In this commentary, I have presented the exegesis in the order of the expressions of the verse, addressing a legal ruling, a grammatical point, a linguistic question, a meaning, or a variant reading, as appropriate.' [8] This formulation identifies the forms of knowledge on which the exegete relies and explains how they are brought together in interpreting the text.

In the introduction to Bidayat al-Mujtahid, Ibn Rushd the Younger offers another model of disciplinary integration: he identifies the evidence underlying juristic questions and draws attention to the subtleties that account for disagreement. Within this approach, differences in legal opinions are understood through examination of the principles on which they rest and the methods jurists employ in interpreting texts. He therefore begins with the means by which rulings are derived, the categories of rulings, and the causes of disagreement before proceeding to purification and other areas of jurisprudence. [9]

This relationship becomes clearer when he details the causes of disagreement. He mentions lexical ambiguity, the possibility of literal and figurative meaning, unrestricted and qualified expressions, and conflicts among proofs; regarding one cause, he states: 'The third is disagreement over grammatical inflection.' [10] These linguistic and legal-theoretical discussions are not separate from the subject of his book; rather, they explain why jurists disagree over particular rulings. The term qur', for example, admits more than one meaning, while an imperative may convey obligation or recommendation depending on its signification and contextual indicators. Establishing the linguistic meaning thus forms part of constructing a legal ruling, and a principle of legal theory becomes a means of regulating the transition from scriptural text to the legal question.

The value of this approach lies in making disagreement intelligible and open to explanation. A student

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[6] Ibn Rushd the Elder, Abu al-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad, Al-Muqaddimat al-Mumahhidat li-Bayan ma Iqtadathu Rusum al-Mudawwanah min al-Ahkam al-Shar'iyyah wa-al-Tahsilat al-Muhkamat li-Ummahat Masa'iliha al-Mushkilat, ed. Muhammad Hajji (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 1st ed., 1408 AH/1988 CE), vol. 1, p. 9.

[7] Ibid., vol. 1, p. 10.

[8] Ibn Atiyyah, Abu Muhammad Abd al-Haqq ibn Ghalib, Al-Muharrar al-Wajiz fi Tafsir al-Kitab al-Aziz, ed. Abd al-Salam Abd al-Shafi Muhammad (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1st ed., 1422 AH/2001 CE), vol. 1, p. 34.

[9] Ibn Rushd the Younger, Abu al-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad, Bidayat al-Mujtahid wa-Nihayat al-Muqtasid (Cairo: Maktabat al-Khanji, 3rd ed., 1415 AH/1994 CE), vol. 1, p. 2.

[10] Ibn Rushd the Younger, Bidayat al-Mujtahid, vol. 1, pp. 4-5.

who knows the rulings of the different schools without their supporting grounds may memorize their positions but cannot understand why they diverge. Once an opinion is connected to a possible meaning of an expression, a grammatical construction, or a particular reconciliation of the evidence, the student progresses from memorizing a conclusion to understanding the reasoning that produces it. This connects the introduction of Ibn Rushd's work to its juristic applications and makes it evidence of the practical interrelationship of disciplines in Andalusian scholarship.

Biographical writings add evidence concerning the breadth of scholarly formation and its connection to practice. In his biography of Ibn Rushd the Younger, Ibn Farhun quotes Ibn al-Abbar's Al-Takmilah: 'People sought his advice in medicine just as they sought his legal opinions in jurisprudence, while he possessed a substantial command of grammar, literature, and philosophy.' [11] The report records recourse to his judgment in two distinct fields rather than merely listing books he studied or wrote. It indicates the coexistence of multiple disciplines in the scholar's education and practice, while the introduction to Bidayat al-Mujtahid reveals how some of them function in the actual construction of juristic analysis.

These introductions demonstrate that the use of multiple disciplines in the service of exegesis and jurisprudence was attested in Andalusia before Ibn Juzayy. Shared commitment to this general principle does not, however, imply identical methods or preferences. Ibn Rushd the Elder outlines the foundations for introducing juristic chapters; Ibn Atiyyah sets out the exegete's procedure in following the sequence of a verse; and Ibn Rushd the Younger emphasizes the causes of differences in legal rulings. The present inquiry, by contrast, concerns how Ibn Juzayy draws on various disciplines across works composed for different purposes. The Andalusian background is therefore a prelude to this specific question, not a substitute for answering it through the author's own texts.

Ibn Juzayy's Intellectual Formation and Writings

The Ibn Juzayy under consideration in this study is Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Abd Allah ibn Yahya ibn Abd al-Rahman ibn Yusuf ibn Juzayy al-Kalbi al-Gharnati, the author of the four works examined here. [12] His student Lisan al-Din Ibn al-Khatib included an account of him in Al-Ihatah, recording his kunya, lineage, and affiliation with Granada, as well as his involvement in scholarship and teaching. The account is especially valuable because it is the testimony of a student personally acquainted with him, rather than a merely retrospective report by a later writer.

Ibn al-Khatib describes his teacher as 'a jurist, a memorizer of knowledge, and an active teacher,' and notes his engagement with Arabic, jurisprudence, legal theory, Qur'anic readings, hadith, and literature, alongside his interest in exegesis and collecting books. He writes: 'May God have mercy upon him: he followed an exemplary course of devotion to learning ... engaging in examination, annotation, and composition. He was a jurist, a memorizer, and a teacher; he participated in the fields of Arabic, jurisprudence, legal theory, Qur'anic readings, hadith, and literature; he retained exegetical learning, mastered scholarly opinions, and amassed books.' [13] The report is significant for the present study because it unites linguistic, textual, and juristic disciplines within a single educational setting and sheds light on the background to the diversity of Ibn Juzayy's writings.

The significance of these reports becomes fuller when they are compared with Ibn Juzayy's actual practice as an author. His biography identifies the sources of his intellectual formation, whereas his books show how he put that formation to use: through the deployment of linguistic meaning in exegesis, the application of principles of legal theory to the interpretation of texts, and the connection of theological inquiry to Qur'anic verses.

Among his works, Ibn al-Khatib lists Al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah, Taqrib al-Wusul ila 'Ilm al-Usul, and Al-Nur al-Mubin fi Qawa'id 'Aqa'id al-Din, alongside writings on Qur'anic readings, hadith, and Arabic. [14] The list reveals the range of his scholarly subjects, many of which nonetheless serve the understanding of the

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[11] Ibn Farhun, Ibrahim ibn Ali ibn Muhammad, Al-Dibaj al-Mudhahhab fi Ma'rifat A'yan 'Ulama' al-Madhhab, ed. Ali Umar (Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqafah al-Diniyyah, 1st ed., 1423 AH/2003 CE), vol. 2, p. 238 (biography of Ibn Rushd the Younger), quoting Ibn al-Abbar's Al-Takmilah.

[12] Ibn al-Khatib, Abu Abd Allah Lisan al-Din Muhammad ibn Abd Allah ibn Sa'id al-Salmani, originally from Lawsh and associated with Granada (d. 776 AH), Al-Ihatah fi Akhbar Gharnatah (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1st ed., 1424 AH), vol. 3, p. 10.

[13] Ibn al-Khatib, Al-Ihatah, vol. 3, p. 11.

[14] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 12.

religious law. According to the biography, Ibn Juzayy's life ended in the Battle of Tarif in 741 AH. [15] His surviving works make it possible to investigate how he selected and arranged scholarly material and how he addressed the same question in different books, rather than remaining content with describing him as a polymath.

On this basis, the four books are read in accordance with their distinct scholarly functions. Al-Nur al-Mubin allows us to examine his formulation of theological positions; the introduction to Al-Qawanin clarifies the place of creed within the architecture of jurisprudence; Taqrib al-Wusul helps identify the instruments of analysis and inference; and Al-Tashil illustrates how some of those instruments are employed in interpreting the Qur'an. These are not conclusions assumed in advance, but questions guiding the reading: Do meanings remain consistent as they pass between works? What is abbreviated in one place and elaborated in another? How do general premises relate to specific applications?

The inquiry thereby shifts from describing a scholar's command of numerous disciplines to testing how he actually draws upon them.

Section Two: The Organization and Functions of Knowledge in Ibn Juzayy's Writings

The introductions to Ibn Juzayy's books reveal his concern to specify the purpose of each composition and the arrangement of its materials. A comparative reading of Al-Nur al-Mubin and Al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah allows us to consider the ordering of knowledge for ease of learning, the relationship between belief and practice, and the comparative presentation of juristic opinions. These features disclose some of the principles by which he combines extensive learning with clarity of exposition.

The Organization of Knowledge in the Service of Writing and Teaching

In the introduction to Al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah, Ibn Juzayy states that he sought to combine three qualities: a foundational presentation of his legal school accompanied by discussion of disagreement among the major schools; sound classification and arrangement; and a combination of concision with clarity. These qualities are interrelated. Comparison increases the material to be presented, systematic arrangement controls that expansion, and concision makes the whole more accessible. Brevity in this work is therefore not simply a reduction in the number of words; it entails deliberate selection of material and organization of its relationships. In describing the third quality as 'combining concision with elucidation,' Ibn Juzayy characterizes the work as 'easy in its expression, subtle in its indications, complete in its meanings, and concise in its wording.' [16]

One of his clearest explanations of this form of concision occurs in his account of the chapter arrangement: 'I brought together each kind with its like, and attached each subsidiary question to its foundation.' He adds that he sometimes gathers under a single heading what other authors separate into numerous headings, in order to reflect their affinity and achieve brevity. [17] The organizing principle is therefore neither page count nor the number of chapters, but resemblance among questions and their derivation from a common foundation. Such an arrangement helps the student locate a question and understand its relationship to neighboring issues.

Attention to the student also appears in his explanation of the book's terminology before beginning its substantive questions. He defines what he means by 'the school,' 'the well-known opinion,' 'the two imams,' and 'the four,' distinguishes two positions within the school from two reports attributed to Malik, and explains the expressions he employs when referring to dissenting jurists. [18] This introduction performs an important function in a concise work: without clarification of terminology, brevity could lead a reader to confuse agreement among the four legal schools with consensus (ijma'), or disagreement within a single school with disagreement between schools. Explicit terminology assigns a determinate meaning to an abbreviated expression and equips the reader to understand what follows. Concision here depends upon an understanding established in advance between author and reader concerning the signification of terms.

In Al-Nur al-Mubin, organization assumes a form suited to its theological purpose. Ibn Juzayy divides the book into three principal foundations: theology concerning the divine, discussion of prophets, angels, religious leaders, and Companions, and finally the afterlife. He adds a concluding exhortation consonant

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[15] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 23.

[16] Ibn Juzayy, Abu al-Qasim Muhammad ibn Ahmad, Al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah, revised and corrected by Muhammad Amin al-Dannawi (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah, 1st ed., 1418 AH/1998 CE), p. 8.

[17] Ibn Juzayy, Al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah, p. 10.

[18] Ibid., p. 9.

with his purpose. [19] The intention is not to equate the arrangement of this work with that of Al-Qawanin, but to observe their shared concern to delimit a subject before elaborating it. In the theological work, readers learn what they are to believe and the arguments supporting those beliefs; in the juristic work, they learn the practical issues and jurists' positions concerning them. Each book thus receives an arrangement of its own, while both are governed by a common aim: to facilitate learning without erasing the distinctions among subjects.

This method illuminates a distinctive feature of Ibn Juzayy's scholarship, including his use of logic to organize questions and premises. Across his writings he is careful to supply what readers need before proceeding to the central issues, a notable feature of his exposition. Such organization identifies the relationship between foundations and subsidiary questions, and between points of agreement and disagreement, preventing matters of different logical status from being treated as equivalent.

Creed and Jurisprudence: Unity of Purpose and Difference of Function

Ibn Juzayy begins Al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah with a theological introduction and explicitly justifies this choice: 'Know that I have opened it with a concise Sunni creed, giving precedence to what is more important. For the foundations are undoubtedly more important than the branches, and it is right to place what is primary before what follows it.' [20] This statement is stronger evidence than the mere presence of theological material at the beginning of the work, because it discloses the author's intention in ordering his subjects. In the architecture of the book, jurisprudence is not detached from the basis of faith upon which religious responsibility rests, although its immediate subject is the rulings governing human actions. Ibn Juzayy therefore places creed first, divides jurisprudence into acts of worship and transactions, and closes with a comprehensive final book (Kitab al-Jami').

Yet this ordering should not be taken to mean that every legal ruling in the book is directly deduced from a theological proposition. The passage establishes a hierarchy of importance and a general foundational relationship; by itself, it does not demonstrate a detailed theological influence upon every subsidiary ruling. This distinction is essential if integration is not to become a sweeping claim unsupported by specific evidence.

What can be established is that Ibn Juzayy introduces the student of jurisprudence to a theological foundation defining the religious framework of knowledge and action, before proceeding to a distinct subject with its own questions and modes of exposition. He does so without conflating the exposition of beliefs with the reporting of legal rulings.

Comparing the opening of Al-Qawanin with that of Al-Nur al-Mubin reveals how the extent of explanation varies according to purpose. In Al-Qawanin, Ibn Juzayy divides the introduction into ten chapters, five on matters of divinity and five on matters known through revelation, beginning with the existence of the Creator. There he discusses the change and origination of created beings, the dependence of whatever begins to exist upon an originator, and the signs of design and wisdom evident in creation, followed by reference to innate human disposition (fitrah) and knowledge of divine lordship. [21] This concise presentation assembles the basic lines of argument needed by the reader without pursuing objections and their possible responses in detail.

Al-Nur al-Mubin, by contrast, aims to explain the beliefs of religion and establish the evidence for them. Ibn Juzayy writes in its introduction: 'We have established for them conclusive rational proofs, which we have derived from the transmitted sciences of revelation.' [22] The conjunction of rational and transmitted knowledge here does not bring together two unrelated spheres. Rather, it describes the author's preferred method of reasoning: examining the meaning indicated by revelation and making the force of the argument explicit. Accordingly, he identifies his first objective as presenting evidence and demonstrations 'so that the one who considers them may advance from uncritical acceptance to certain knowledge,' and his second as deriving these proofs, or most of them, from the Qur'an. [23] Reason serves understanding and inference, while the Qur'an directs attention to the relevant indications. In this context the two are not presented as competing avenues to knowledge.

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[19] Ibn Juzayy, Al-Nur al-Mubin fi Qawa'id 'Aqa'id al-Din, prepared by Nizar Hammadi (Tunis: Dar al-Imam Ibn Arafah; Kuwait: Dar al-Diya', 1st ed., 1436 AH/2015 CE), p. 22.

[20] Ibn Juzayy, Al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah, p. 9.

[21] Ibid., p. 10.

[22] Ibn Juzayy, Al-Nur al-Mubin, p. 21.

[23] Ibid., p. 22.

The method is evident in his demonstration of God's existence through reflection upon created things. He begins with the earth and heavens, animals, plants, mountains, seas, and other phenomena, linking them to Qur'anic verses that invite contemplation. He then makes the argument more accessible by considering the creation of the human being, the organization of bodily organs, and the distinct benefit of each. Next he asks what proves that created things have come into existence, answering by reference to changes in their attributes and the human being's awareness of having come into existence after previously not existing. [24] The proof is not offered as an abstract assertion; it proceeds from observable things to a question about what they signify and then to an answer establishing the inference. This elaboration fulfills a function in a theological work that an abridged manual of jurisprudence does not need to reproduce at the same length.

The functional difference concerns not only the level of detail but also the scope of intended debate. In Al-Nur al-Mubin, Ibn Juzayy states that he confines himself to the principal questions brought by the religious law and discussed by the early generations, leaving aside later methods of contention and disputation and refraining from questions concerning disagreements among sects. [25] This statement cannot properly be construed as a rejection of every theological instrument, since the book contains rational proofs and replies to questions and objections. More plausibly, it specifies the kind of disputation he wishes to avoid and defines the book's goal as strengthening belief and demonstrating its grounds rather than exhaustively cataloguing sectarian positions. In this way, reasoning is combined with concision, and the scope of discussion is governed by the educational purpose the author has stated.

The comparison thus reveals different functions for theological exposition in the two books and helps clarify the relationship between their purposes. In Al-Qawanin, the theological introduction establishes the relationship of practice to belief; Al-Nur al-Mubin develops the evidence for belief and explains how it may be made accessible. The difference in length does not represent inconsistency, but rather the adaptation of exposition to each book's requirements. A subject may be treated briefly when it serves as an introduction and in detail when it becomes the principal object of inquiry, while the underlying meanings and direction of argument remain related.

Comparative Presentation and Its Limits in Al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah

Ibn Juzayy explicitly identifies his book with the Maliki school, but does not regard that affiliation as a barrier to knowledge of other schools. He explains that, alongside presenting the Maliki position, he points to numerous agreements and disagreements among Malik, al-Shafi'i, Abu Hanifah, and Ahmad, and that he also cites other imams, including Dawud al-Zahiri, al-Layth ibn Sa'd, and al-Awza'i. He comments: 'Each of them is an independent interpreter [mujtahid] in God's religion, and their schools are paths leading to God.' [26] The statement expresses respect for differing exercises of ijtihad; it does not mean that the author erases differences among opinions or regards every opinion as equally preferable in a single case. Its function in context is to justify benefiting from the imams' scholarship and broadening the field of juristic understanding.

His phrase 'combining an introductory presentation of the school with discussion of disagreement among the major schools' defines the character of this approach. [27] The introductory exposition makes the Maliki school the point of departure; discussion of disagreement situates it in relation to other schools. Accordingly, Ibn Juzayy explains that he presents Malik's position first, followed by the positions of others, either explicitly or by implication. This arrangement prevents the book from being described as a neutral account with no guiding center, while equally preventing its reduction to a closed summary of a single school.

It is a concise manual with a clear school affiliation, yet one that admits comparison insofar as comparison enhances its usefulness and acquaints readers with points of agreement and divergence.

A clear example occurs in his presentation of the types of ablution (wudu'). He classifies them as obligatory, recommended, Sunnah, permissible, and prohibited, assigns particular instances to these categories, and notes disagreement over ablution for touching the Qur'anic codex, performing circumambulation, and preparing for sleep while in a state of major ritual impurity. [28] The reader thus encounters, in a single place, the classifications of rulings, their applications, and the main points of

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[24] Ibid., pp. 25-30.

[25] Ibid., p. 22.

[26] Ibn Juzayy, Al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah, pp. 7-8.

[27] Ibid., pp. 8-9.

[28] Ibid., p. 24.

disagreement. The value of this organization lies in bringing disparate questions into a coherent and memorable scheme, with disagreement integrated into the presentation rather than separated into another work.

The method is still clearer in his discussion of intention (niyyah). He defines intention as purpose, then identifies the acts of devotion for which it is required, distinguishing the removal of impurity from tayammum, ablution (wudu'), and the full ritual bath (ghusl), and explaining agreement in some cases and disagreement in others. After stating the general rule, he adds two subsidiary questions regarding the object and locus of intention. [29] The exposition thus moves from the concept itself to the conditions governing its use, and then to applied cases and the disagreements surrounding them. This progression exemplifies a well-ordered juristic argument. It does not, however, suffice to attribute the cited disagreements to a particular theological cause; that attribution would require another text demonstrating the connection and should not be inferred merely because theology and jurisprudence appear in the same book.

This comparative presentation has limits that must be respected. It does not invariably provide a full account of each school's proofs or the relative authority of the reports transmitted from it. Ibn Juzayy also qualifies what may be inferred from his silence about disagreement: 'This generally indicates that there is no disagreement concerning it.' [30] The word 'generally' matters, because it prevents every instance of silence from being treated as a claim of consensus. Nor may the expression 'the four' be equated with consensus: Ibn Juzayy explicitly uses it to designate the four imams, whose positions others may dispute. Here again, the value of precise terminology lies in preventing conclusions broader than the wording warrants.

In sum, integration in these examples neither eliminates specialization nor effaces methodological differences. A theological work seeks to establish belief and its supporting arguments; a juristic manual organizes practice and reports disagreement; and the theological introduction connects these domains within the structure of a single book. A consistent concern for the reader unites these efforts, reflected in systematic concision, explanation of terminology, the ordering of foundations and branches, and respect for divergent scholarly reasoning. We may therefore turn to evidence and examples shared across Ibn Juzayy's writings to investigate how knowledge is redeployed when a book's subject and purpose change.

Section Three: Manifestations of Knowledge Integration in Ibn Juzayy's Applied Scholarship

This section examines three areas in which the connections among disciplines become evident in the practice of reasoning: explaining juristic disagreement arising from lexical ambiguity; interpreting particles and the implications for preferring one opinion over another; and expounding a theological proof across several works. The analysis relies on specific passages that make it possible to trace the movement from meaning to evidence and then to a legal ruling or conclusion.

From a Principle of Legal Theory to the Explanation of Juristic Disagreement

In the introduction to Al-Tashil, Ibn Juzayy explicitly states that a Qur'anic exegete needs usul al-fiqh, describing it as 'an excellent aid to understanding meanings and preferring among opinions.' [31] He then lists a number of categories concerning linguistic signification: explicit and apparent meanings (nass and zahir), ambiguous and clarified expressions (mujmal and mubayyan), general and particular expressions ('amm and khass), unrestricted and qualified expressions (mutlaq and muqayyad), and the a fortiori implication and contrary implication of an utterance (fahwa al-khitab and dalil al-khitab). He follows these with the conditions for abrogation, forms of conflict among proofs, and causes of disagreement. The significance of the passage lies not in the abundance of technical terms, but in the role assigned to the discipline: understanding meanings and evaluating competing interpretations.

This point emerges in his discussion of the homonymous expression (al-lafz al-mushtarak). In Taqrib al-Wusul, he distinguishes the conventional assignment of a word to a meaning, the speaker's use of that word, and the listener's interpretation of it as conveying a particular meaning. After discussing disagreement over the use of a single expression in more than one sense, he states: 'When a homonymous expression occurs with a contextual indicator, it must be understood according to the meaning indicated by that context; when it occurs without contextual indicators, judgment is suspended, and no particular interpretation is adopted without evidence.' He then reports al-Shafi'i's view that, as a precaution, it should be understood as

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[29] Ibid., p. 24.

[30] Ibid., p. 9.

[31] Ibn Juzayy, Al-Tashil li-'Ulum al-Tanzil, ed. Ali ibn Hamud al-Salihi, with notes by Abd al-Rahman ibn Nasir al-Barrak (Mecca: Dar Taybah al-Khadra', 1st ed., 1439 AH/2018 CE), vol. 1, pp. 81-82.

encompassing all its possible meanings. [32] The passage shows that identifying a plurality of meanings in language does not itself settle the intended meaning of a text; evidence is still needed to determine which meaning is intended.

In explaining the divine statement, 'Divorced women shall wait by themselves for three quruʾ' (Qur'an 2:228), Ibn Juzayy begins from precisely this problem. He observes that the Arabic word qurʾ is lexically shared between a period of ritual purity between menstruations and a menstrual period. He presents Malik's and al-Shafi'i's interpretation as a period of purity, supporting it by the feminine numeral ending in thalathah ('three'), since tuhr (purity) is grammatically masculine whereas hayd (menstruation) is feminine, and by A'ishah's statement, 'The aqraʾ are periods of purity.' By contrast, he reports Abu Hanifah's interpretation as menstrual periods, since menstruation establishes the absence of pregnancy, which is the purpose of the waiting period ('iddah). He then explains the practical consequence of the disagreement: according to Malik, when divorce takes place during a period of purity in which no intercourse has occurred, the waiting period ends upon entry into the third menstrual period; according to Abu Hanifah, it ends upon the completion of that period of menstruation. [33]

Several forms of analysis converge in this brief discussion. Lexicography establishes that the expression bears more than one meaning; grammar supplies grounds for choosing one of them; a transmitted report reinforces that reading; and reflection on the purpose of the ruling explains the competing position. The practical outcome is the determination of precisely when the waiting period expires.

Ibn Juzayy does not explicitly settle which interpretation is preferable at this point. Moreover, the purpose of the waiting period appears in his exposition of the argument attributed to Abu Hanifah. The comparison therefore reveals a clear application of the principle governing homonymous expressions: a word may have multiple linguistic meanings, the contextual indicators invoked in support of each may differ, and the derived legal ruling may consequently vary.

The same understanding is supported by his treatment of the divine words 'or you have touched women' (Qur'an 4:43). He presents three interpretations of physical contact: sexual intercourse and acts short of it; contact short of sexual intercourse; and sexual intercourse alone. He then relates each meaning to its consequences for invalidating ablution and permitting dry ablution for a person in a state of major ritual impurity. He does not merely report that the expression is disputed; rather, he uses variation in its meaning to explain the divergence in legal rulings. Where one position requires clarification of a ruling that cannot be inferred directly from the verse, he refers to a hadith, indicating that limits to the signification of a particular verse do not eliminate the need to consider other evidence relevant to the question. [34]

Interpreting Particles and Their Effect on Legal Inference and Preference

The integration of Arabic linguistics, legal theory, and jurisprudence is more explicit in Ibn Juzayy's exegesis of the verse concerning tayammum. In commenting upon the words 'or one of you comes from relieving himself' (Qur'an 4:43), he identifies two possible meanings of the particle aw ('or'): it may retain its ordinary function of distinguishing alternatives, or it may be understood in the sense of wa ('and'). He then explains that the issue is not a purely linguistic disagreement, because the interpretation of the particle changes the relationship of the condition of not finding water to the preceding clauses, thereby affecting the argument for the permissibility of dry ablution for a healthy person who is not travelling. [35]

On the first reading, the words 'and you find no water' refer both to the sick person and the traveller and to anyone who has relieved himself or had physical contact, whether or not that person is sick or travelling. The verse therefore supports the permissibility of dry ablution for a healthy, non-travelling person when water is unavailable. On the second reading, the condition applies to the sick person and the traveller; thus this particular reading does not establish permission for a healthy, non-travelling person, although such permission might be established by other evidence. This distinction prevents the conflation of two separate matters: whether a legal ruling is established in jurisprudence and whether this particular passage provides evidence for it. A ruling may be established even when scholars disagree about the way a text supports it.

Ibn Juzayy prefers to retain aw in its ordinary sense and offers two reasons. First, treating it as

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[32] Ibn Juzayy, Taqrib al-Wusul ila 'Ilm al-Usul, prepared by Jalal Ali al-Juhani, electronic edition, no publisher or date stated, p. 38; compared with the edition by Muhammad al-Mukhtar ibn al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Amin al-Shinqiti, 2nd ed., no publisher stated, 1423 AH/2002 CE, pp. 131-132.

[33] Ibn Juzayy, Al-Tashil, vol. 1, p. 445, commentary on Qur'an 2:228.

[34] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 62-63, commentary on Qur'an 4:43.

[35] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 61.

synonymous with wa departs from its original meaning. Second, preserving the ordinary meaning establishes the ruling concerning a healthy, non-travelling person when water is unavailable, whereas reading it as wa does not. The first argument preserves the primary signification of the particle; the second concerns the wider legal implications made possible by that reading. The second is not independent of the first: Ibn Juzayy does not invent a new meaning for the particle in pursuit of a useful legal conclusion; rather, he reinforces its established sense by demonstrating what it allows one to understand of the ruling. [36]

This analysis is consistent with Ibn Juzayy's account in Taqrib al-Wusul of conflicts between the implications of expressions: the more probable interpretation should be preferred, and speech understood accordingly, unless evidence indicates that a less probable meaning is intended. He recognizes the weight of the primary meaning, while allowing departure from it when sufficient evidence exists. The comparison does not require us to claim that his commentary on this verse was deliberately constructed as an application of a specific sentence from Taqrib al-Wusul. It shows, rather, a consistent method of inquiry: identify the primary meaning, examine the alternative, and require justification for departing from the former. [37]

The example gains further significance when Ibn Juzayy presents the opposing argument: retaining aw in its ordinary sense might suggest that illness and travel are themselves states of ritual impurity requiring ablution, since coming from the place of relieving oneself is coordinated with them. Rather than simply dismissing the objection, he replies that the coordination here serves to distinguish different cases. He restates the meaning in a way that removes the alleged difficulty: tayammum is permissible, when water is unavailable, in cases of illness or travel, or when a state of ritual impurity arises outside those two situations. The analysis thus proceeds through distinct stages: a linguistic possibility, a legal consequence, a reasoned preference, an objection, and a response. This provides a practical example of several disciplines working together within a single question. [38]

Ibn Juzayy further explains the significance of language in the remainder of the verse when interpreting the word ṣaʿīd. According to Malik, it denotes the surface of the earth, whether soil, sand, or stone; according to al-Shafi'i, it refers exclusively to soil. Ibn Juzayy accordingly relates the disputes concerning tayammum with minerals, salt, transported soil, a wall, and other materials to differing understandings of ṣaʿīd. [39] The passage reveals an important benefit: multiple juristic questions can be brought together under a shared linguistic foundation instead of remaining an unrelated list of rulings. This does not mean that every detail of the subject is reducible to language alone; it identifies the foundation by which Ibn Juzayy links these subsidiary questions in his commentary.

Theological Proof between Didactic Exposition and Qur'anic Exegesis

The relationship among disciplines is not confined to verses concerned with legal rulings. It is equally present in the interpretation of verses that establish evidence for fundamental beliefs. An especially clear example is the divine statement, 'Then each deity would have taken away what it had created, and some of them would have sought supremacy over others' (Qur'an 23:91). Ibn Juzayy describes this verse as a proof of divine oneness and explains its reasoning: if there were multiple deities, each would possess its own creations and exercise independent dominion, seeking supremacy over the others, just as happens among earthly kings. He contrasts this hypothesis with the interdependence observable in creation, stating: 'But since we see all created beings connected to one another, so that the whole world is like a single sphere, we know that its owner and governor is one, and that there is no deity besides Him.' [40]

Thus, in establishing divine oneness, Ibn Juzayy draws upon the proof of mutual hindrance (dalil al-tamanu'), familiar from works of Islamic theology. It explains the connection between denying a plurality of deities and the verse's description of each hypothetical deity taking exclusive possession of what it created and seeking supremacy. The argument moves from a hypothesis to its implications and then contrasts those implications with the condition of the world as Ibn Juzayy describes it. [41]

A parallel treatment occurs in Al-Nur al-Mubin, where Ibn Juzayy develops the argument from the interconnection of the world's constituent parts. He explains the dependence of humans and animals on plants, and of plants on rainfall and associated conditions, before likening the ordered universe to a single

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[36] Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 61-62.

[37] Ibn Juzayy, Taqrib al-Wusul, al-Juhani electronic edition, p. 53; compare p. 175 of the edition by al-Shinqiti.

[38] Ibn Juzayy, Al-Tashil, vol. 2, p. 62.

[39] Ibid., vol. 2, p. 63.

[40] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 254, commentary on Qur'an 23:91.

[41] Ibn Khaldun, Diwan al-Mubtada' wa-al-Khabar, p. 647.

city that cannot have more than one lord. [42] What the two passages share is the inference from interconnectedness to the unity of governance. The theological book, however, expands the illustrations through which the proof is made accessible to students, whereas in the commentary the argument is directed toward explaining the verse and refuting the claim that there are multiple deities. This represents a shared underlying argument with differing degrees of explanation according to the purpose of each work, not merely the repetition of the same wording in two places.

The comparison is completed by considering the theological introduction to Al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah. In the fourth chapter, devoted to God's oneness, Ibn Juzayy brings together four Qur'anic verses as evidence of divine unity. The verse from Surat al-Mu'minun is the third, and he comments: 'The fact that all existence is interconnected is evidence that its owner is one.' Before it, he cites the verse 'If there had been in the heavens and the earth gods other than God, both would have fallen into ruin' (Qur'an 21:22), commenting: 'From this the theologians derived the proof of mutual hindrance, although the Qur'an is more eloquent and clearer.' [43] His distinction between the two arguments is therefore not an incidental observation confined to his exegesis; it also appears in his selection and arrangement of verses and in the way he deploys them as proofs.

Taken together, these three passages allow a more precise description of Ibn Juzayy's method. In Al-Nur al-Mubin, he illustrates the order of creation through examples of interdependence among existing things. In Al-Qawanin, he compresses the proof into a sentence appropriate to a brief introduction. In Al-Tashil, he links the argument to the wording of the verse. This comparison alone cannot establish the chronological order of the books or prove that one served as the direct source of another. It does, however, establish the persistence of a particular line of reasoning across theological, juristic, and exegetical compositions. The theological introduction to the legal manual thus preserves some of the doctrinal foundations elaborated in a separate book, rather than forming an alien chapter within Ibn Juzayy's wider scholarly output.

The passage in Al-Tashil also contains a critical distinction that must not be overlooked. Having presented the argument, Ibn Juzayy states: 'This proof is not the proof of mutual hindrance, as Ibn Atiyyah and others understood it; rather, it is a different proof.' [44] Here he does not simply combine material from exegesis and theology without discrimination; he also examines whether a particular proof has been correctly named and classified. The text directly establishes his objection to identifying this argument with the proof of mutual hindrance. His remark thus demonstrates concern for the type of proof involved and his refusal to equate two arguments merely because both establish divine oneness.

On the following page he returns to linguistic analysis, asking why the particle idhan ('then') appears without an explicit preceding condition or question. He answers that the condition has been omitted, its implied sense being 'if there had been other deities alongside Him,' as indicated by the words 'and there was no deity with Him' (Qur'an 23:91). [45] Syntactic analysis of the verse is thus used to make explicit an unstated premise of the argument. Grammatical explanation and the formulation of the proof work together to clarify the basis of the inference.

Together, these examples show that integration in Ibn Juzayy's scholarship emerges through particular functions performed by different disciplines within a question. Language identifies possible meanings; legal theory organizes their assessment; jurisprudence explains their implications for rulings; and theology directs inquiry into the structure and conclusion of an argument. The relative prominence of each discipline varies with the need at hand. A passage that reports disagreement without preferring an opinion is not equivalent to one that provides reasons for a preference and answers an objection, nor to one that distinguishes the names of proofs. The most accurate characterization of Ibn Juzayy's practice is therefore that he brings together the knowledge required to understand a text and explain its legal or argumentative significance, while respecting the limitations of what his wording establishes and refraining from attributing to him positions on which he is silent.

Conclusion

The examination of selected passages has demonstrated that relationships among disciplines in Ibn Juzayy's writings extend beyond the diversity of his books to the concrete use of principles and proofs in

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[42] Ibn Juzayy, Al-Nur al-Mubin fi Qawa'id 'Aqa'id al-Din, pp. 42-43.

[43] Ibn Juzayy, Al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah, p. 13, ch. 4, 'On the Oneness of God Most High.'

[44] Ibn Juzayy, Al-Tashil, vol. 3, p. 254.

[45] Ibid., vol. 3, p. 255.

clarifying particular questions. Comparison among these works has made it possible to distinguish three things: the scholar's multidisciplinary formation, his manner of organizing scholarly material, and his employment of that knowledge in interpreting texts and constructing arguments. These dimensions contribute jointly to understanding his intellectual practice, but each has its own evidence and limits of interpretation.

The study has shown that beginning Al-Qawanin al-Fiqhiyyah with creed was a deliberate choice that Ibn Juzayy explicitly justified. Comparison with Al-Nur al-Mubin reveals how the degree of elaboration varies according to the work's function. Where theology serves as an introduction to jurisprudence, the author does not develop its principles at length; when theology itself becomes the subject of a work, he explains the evidence for those principles and makes it more accessible to the reader. Throughout, his method proceeds by organizing premises before presenting their implications and conclusions. This is evident in his argument for God's existence and in the proof of divine oneness, whose central reasoning recurs in both books and in Al-Tashil, though with different degrees of detail.

The discussion of qurʾ also demonstrates that recognizing the multiplicity of a word's linguistic meanings opens the way to examining contextual indicators, and that considering those indicators explains part of the divergence in legal rulings. In this example, Ibn Juzayy combines lexical signification, grammatical analysis, a transmitted report, and the purpose of the waiting period before explaining the practical consequence of the disagreement.

In the interpretation of the verse concerning tayammum, the effect of a principle of legal theory becomes apparent in the treatment of a particle. Ibn Juzayy prefers the ordinary meaning of aw ('or'), explains the legal benefit that follows, then presents and answers a contrary objection, drawing upon his background in theological argumentation. This example therefore reveals the actual operation of preference among interpretations more clearly than a mere enumeration of the disciplines needed by an exegete.

The principal contribution of this study, then, is to explain the relationship among comparable passages in works belonging to different disciplines and to show what their differing contexts of composition add to our understanding. Knowledge integration does not, however, mean that the sciences lose their distinct identities or that all their methods become identical. Each of Ibn Juzayy's books retains its own subject matter and the degree of elaboration appropriate to its purpose.

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